Because of the events of 11 September 2001, the FAA should expect several calls for immediate installation of biometric technologies in airports to improve security. Many of these calls will result in near-term in-situ demonstrations throughout the United States using a variety of biometric types and vendors. Some of these demonstrations could succeed while others will fail because of the rush to install and/or the lack of capability of the technology, vendor, or entity performing the demonstration. Whatever the result, these in-situ demonstrations will produce measurables that will help the FAA determine how they could conceivably implement a biometrics solution nationwide. It will be impossible to fully understand the measurables derived from these in-situ demonstrations without results from technology evaluations. Unfortunately, these evaluations are not available for most biometric types.
Since the events of September 11, air travel security has become an increasingly important issue for governments, airlines and airline passengers. As a result, several countries have increased their existing airport security taxes in an effort to offset the costs of providing enhanced security equipment and baggage/passenger screening. This report details dedicated airport security taxes for domestic and international flights in 69 countries. By "dedicated", we are referring to taxes whose revenue is applied exclusively to airport security measures. Taxes levied for more than one purpose (e.g., Switzerland's Air Passenger Security and Noise Charge) are not included unless a breakdown of each tax component is available. As shown below, security taxes can add between $0.42 to $20.00 to the cost of an international ticket. International tickets are typically taxed at a higher rate than domestic tickets; domestic security taxes average around $2.44 per ticket, while taxes on an international ticket average around $3.46.
Prohibited items are weapons, explosives, incendiaries, and include items that are seemingly harmless but may be used as weapons—the so-called "dual use" items. You may not bring these items to security checkpoints without authorization. If you bring a prohibited item to the checkpoint, you may be criminally and/or civilly prosecuted or, at the least, asked to rid yourself of the item. A screener and/or Law Enforcement Officer will make this determination, depending on what the item is and the circumstances. This is because bringing a prohibited item to a security checkpoint—even accidentally—is illegal.
The terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center have emphasized that the present U.S. airport security system is not adequate to the task.
The American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE) and Airports Council International - North America (ACI-NA) asked the Academy to examine the regulatory model that governs security relationships between the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and airport authorities. They raised concerns about the current status of relations among the security partners and wanted the Academy to consider ways of improving the operation of existing security procedures, practices, and relationships and possible alternative models or approaches that might enhance airport security. This report reflects the results of the preliminary phase of that analysis.
Since September 11, 2001, TSA has made considerable progress in meeting congressional mandates designed to increase aviation security. By the end of 2002, the agency had hired and deployed about 65,000 passenger and baggage screeners, federal air marshals, and others, and it was using explosives detection equipment to screen about 90 percent of all checked baggage. TSA is also initiating or developing efforts that focus on the use of technology and information to advance security. One effort under development, the next-generation Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS II), would use national security and commercial databases to identify passengers who could pose risks for additional screening. Concerns about privacy rights will need to be addressed as this system moves toward implementation.
Transportation Security Regulations (TSRs) are codified in Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Chapter XII, parts 1500 through 1699.
The Transportation Security Administration protects the Nation's transportation systems to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce.
Washington DC bureaucrats think we need their permission before we can get on a plane. We think they're wrong. They don't understand that up here in Alaska, we use airplanes the way you use taxis. And that's why we, a group of Alaskans, are turning to the US District Court for help. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) wants to start collecting our personal information and use it to tell us whether we can or cannot fly. This TSA program, called CAPPS II, will force us to turn over a lot of private data to the government so they can run background checks on us. They'll send the same information over to private companies and run us through -their- databases so make sure we are who we say we are. Depending on what the computers say, you'll either be arrested at the airport or be granted the privilege of being searched by the TSA before being allowed to travel. The TSA has already issued (or will issue) a secret Security Directive ordering airlines to turn over all their passenger records so they can test the CAPPS II system. Secrecy. Background checks. Security Directives. What's going on here? We think the Feds need to tell us what they're planning before they start turning every flight we take into an excuse to snoop. The TSA didn't bother responding to a letter we sent, so we're asking the US District Court in Anchorage to help us find out the truth.